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Tässä tutkimuksessa kehitetään menetelmä, jonka avulla voidaan laskea markkinaosapuol-
ten näkemys tulevan valuuttakriisin toteutumisajankohdasta käyttämällä korkojen suhteel-
lista tuottokäyrää. Menetelmän avulla voidaan arvioida, mikä on suhteellinen todennäköi-
syys, että kriisi toteutuu viikon sisällä tai viikon kuluttua mutta ennen kuin kuukausi on 
kulunut. Työssä esitetään, miten indikaattori on ennustanut tapahtumat kahdessa tärkeässä 
Itä-Euroopan valuuttakriisissä eli Tšekin kriisissä 1997 ja Venäjän kriisissä 1998. 
 















 An ￿Almost-Too-Late" Warning




We propose exploiting the term structure of relative interest rates
to obtain estimates of changes in the timing of a currency crisis as
perceived by market participants. Our indicator can be used to evaluate
the relative probability of a crisis occurring in one week as compared
to a crisis happening after one week but in less than a month. We give
empirical evidence that the indicator performs well for two important
currency crises in Eastern Europe: the crisis in the Czech Republic in
1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998.
Keywords: Currency crisis, term structure of interest rates, transition
economies.
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The abundance and severity of currency crises and speculative attacks over the
past 15 years has spawned a rebirth of interest among researchers, politicians
and central bankers in these events. Currency crises tend to be painful and
costly for the a⁄ected economy and usually a› ict the population immediately.
Two recent cases illustrate this. The Argentine ￿nancial turmoil of 2002, one of
the most violent currency crises on record, induced an increase in the poverty
rate of more than 50% and drove nearly two out of three Argentines below the
poverty line. Indonesia￿ s crisis in 1998 caused a drop in GDP of more than
13% within a year.
Considering the spectrum of distinct exchange rate arrangements, ranging from
totally ￿ exible exchange rates to monetary unions and currency boards, there
seems to be ample evidence that intermediate regimes such as ￿xed and crawl-
ing pegs or ￿ uctuation bands are most prone to speculative attack. For this rea-
son, countries have increasingly abandoned intermediate regimes for arrange-
ments at the extremes (see e.g. Fischer, 2001).1 Yet today an unraveling of
current global imbalances threatens even a large and closed economy with a
￿ exible exchange rate regime like the United States with abrupt and signi￿-
cant currency depreciation (see Roubini and Setser, 2005). While admittedly
experts who consider this possibility as remote likely outnumber proponents
of the view that the Bretton Woods 2 system of exchange rates is unsustain-
able (see e.g. Dooley et al, 2004; or Hausmann and Sturzenegger, 2005), there
are undoubtedly countries whose fundamental macroeconomic and/or political
conditions make them vulnerable to speculative attack. Hungary, for example,
which still maintains an intermediate exchange rate arrangement, was running
a current account and ￿scal de￿cit in 2005 roughly 2.5 times greater than Ar-
gentina before its devastating crisis hit.
Motivated by the damaging potential e⁄ects of currency crises, both the theo-
retical and empirical literature has received renewed attention from researchers.
Not only have new generations of currency crisis models been developed in re-
sponse to unsatisfactory theoretical instruments to describe and explain causes
and frequency of crises in the 1990s, economists have also started pondering
ways to predict the timing of such events (e.g. both the Mexican crisis in 1994
1Notwithstanding the fact that de jure exchange rate regimes need not coincide with de
facto regimes (see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
2and the Asian crisis in 1997 essentially caught the international community
￿ at-footed). Unfortunately, the forecasting models proposed over the past few
years have generally demonstrated only fair-to-middling predictive accuracy.
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (KLR) pioneered quantitative currency cri-
sis early-warning systems (EWS) with their ￿indicator￿model developed in a
series of papers (see Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998). The KLR ap-
proach monitors the evolution of several economic variables (indicators) such
that when a variable deviates from its ￿normal￿level beyond a threshold value,
a signal is said to issue. The threshold value is chosen so as to minimize the
noise-to-signal ratio given the data available. Eventually, a composite indica-
tor is constructed as an average of indicators, weighted by frequency of correct
predictions.
Following KLR, academics and economists working in the private sector pro-
duced a wide range of currency crisis forecasting models. Unlike the indicator
approach, most are variations of logit or probit regressions. It is noteworthy
that all such models, including the KLR model, use fundamental data such as
current account, exchange rate overvaluation or export growth as explanatory
variables. The variable choices are predominantly inspired by the three gen-
erations of theories of balance-of-payment crises, but they tend to be limited
by availability of data. The academic models tend to be long-sight approaches
with forecasting horizons of up to two years, while their private-sector coun-
terparts usually focus on a brief windows of one to three months.
Berg et al. (2004) not only give a very helpful overview of the abundant litera-
ture on EWS, they also address the question of how much, if any, out-of-sample
forecasting value derives from EWS. They put particular emphasis on the po-
tential performance of models in real time and reach rather disappointing con-
clusions. Only one of the long-horizon forecasts under consideration (the KLR
model forecast) provides better accuracy compared with pure guesswork and
non-model based predictions, while short-horizon private-sector approaches by
and large perform poorly. Anzuini and Gandolfo (2003), when testing whether
the KLR would have forecast the Thai crisis of 1997, conclude the indicator
approach has strong ex-post explanatory power but quite limited predictive
abilities.
In this paper, we propose exploiting the term structure of relative interest rates
3to obtain estimates of changes in the timing of a currency crisis as perceived
by market participants. To our knowledge, only a handful of researchers have
used this approach. The essence of our model is based on the seminal work by
Collins (1984), who applied her analysis to the March 1983 devaluation of the
French franc relative to the German deutschmark. The Collins approach was
also used in Anzuini and Gandolfo (2003), who compare the predictive power
of the KLR approach and the Collins model. They conclude that the Collins
non-structural approach forecasts well but does not explain, while the oppo-
site is true for the structural KLR model. This approach does not rely on the
estimation of thresholds (eventually common to a group of countries) based
on fundamentals, but instead extracts expectations on the timing of the crisis
from country-speci￿c interest rate data. Compared with the KLR and other
EWS, this approach has several important advantages. First, it requires no
de￿nition of a crisis in terms of percentage devaluation/depreciation, which, as
the literature shows is rather arbitrary anyway. Moreover, no pooling of data
is necessary to obtain a sample of a usable size. For each country in question,
only its own speci￿c data may be used. In addition, as the model uses only
very basic data such as interest and exchange rates; it is not heavily limited by
data availability. We construct an early warning indicator that can be used to
evaluate the relative probability of a crisis occurring in one week as compared
to a crisis happening after one week but in less than a month. Subsequently,
we provide empirical evidence that the indicator performs well for the currency
crises in the Czech Republic in 1997 and in Russia in 1998.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section the theoretical model
is developed. In sections three and four, we apply the indicator to the crisis of
the koruna and ruble crises in 1997 and 1998, respectively. Section 5 concludes
and sets up paths of further research.
2 Uncovered interest rate parity and currency
crises
Recent research on the predictive power of markets suggests that markets can
aggregate disperse information and that market-based forecasts of uncertain
events are usually fairly accurate. Moreover, such forecasts typically outper-
form alternative forecasting tools, including highly sophisticated forecasting
models, polls or expert surveys (see e.g. Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004). The
4basic objective of our analysis is to examine the ability of foreign exchange
markets to foresee exceptional exchange rate devaluations. In substance, the
following model is based on the work by Collins (1984) (see also Anzuini and
Gandolfo, 2003), designed to study the behavior of speculators prior to the
French franc realignment in 1983. Our theoretical setting extends and gener-
alizes the original model in several aspects.
The aim of our study is to construct an indicator based on basic economic
theory (the uncovered interest rate parity, henceforth UIP) to proxy the change
in the time structure of the underlying expected probabilities of devaluation
implied by the relative term structure of interest rates. Assuming perfect








where et is the spot exchange rate at time t, de￿ned as the price of foreign
currency in domestic currency units, it;k and i￿
t;k are, respectively, the domestic
and foreign interest rates at time t on deposits with maturity k. E(et+kj￿t)
stands for the expected exchange rate in period t + k given the information
available at time t (the information set ￿t) and ￿t;k represents a premium for
risks not immediately related to the exchange rate movements (e.g. country
default risk).2
Equation (1) states that the relative yield on domestic deposits of a given
maturity is equal to the expected exchange rate movement and some well-
de￿ned country risk premium. Rewriting (1) to obtain an explicit relationship
between exchange rate expectations and the interest rate structure, we obtain
2In our speci￿cation, the risk premium is assumed to be unrelated to the exchange rate.
In certain cases, it may be reasonable to assume that the exchange rate level has an e⁄ect
on the risk premium. For instance, if domestic debt is denominated mostly in the currency
of the foreign country, one might expect that after a substantial devaluation, the probability
of default and thus the risk premium in the domestic country would rise. This e⁄ect can be
easily incorporated in the model by specifying a functional form linking the exchange rate
to the risk premium. If the relationship is assumed to be linear in the exchange rate with a
slope that is not maturity-dependent, the results presented in this section remain unchanged.
For a general functional speci￿cation of this relationship, the model could still be applied
after calibrating some extra parameters. We do not follow this avenue in the present study,









From the perspective of the market agent forming expectations in time t, the
exchange rate can remain stable, appreciate, or depreciate. Therefore, the
exchange rate expected as of t for the period t + k is a weighted average
of these scenarios, where the weight assigned to each possible exchange rate
movement is the subjectively perceived probability of these events. Formally,
this implies that
E(et+kj￿t)) = (1 ￿ ￿t;k)st;k + ￿t;kzt;k; (3)
where zt;k is the expected exchange rate in period t+k in case of devaluation,
zt;k = ￿t;ket, where ￿t;k > 1, and st;k is the expected exchange rate condi-
tional on no devaluation (in other words, the exchange rate remains stable
or appreciates), and st;k = ￿t;ket, where ￿t;k ￿ 1. The subjective probability
of devaluation having occurred after k periods is therefore ￿t;k. In addition,
along the lines of Collins (1984), we assume that the rate of depreciation or
appreciation does not depend on the temporal horizon, so that ￿t;k = ￿t and
￿t;k = ￿t. It follows that
E(et+kj￿t) = [￿t + (￿t ￿ ￿t)￿t;k]et; (4)
which can be substituted in (2) so as to establish the link between relative
yields and the subjective devaluation probability
￿t;k = ￿t + (￿t ￿ ￿t)￿t;k + ￿t;k; (5)
where ￿t;k = (1+it;k)=(1+i￿
t;k). The essential term in equation (5) is the per-
ceived probability of a devaluation between time t and t+k, ￿t;k. Anticipating
the empirical application of the method, we restrict ourselves to devaluations
occurring within each of the time intervals corresponding to the maturities
of the available time deposits. If there are J ￿ 1 di⁄erent maturities of de-
posits ordered from the shortest to the longest, there are J possible states of
the world at time t. An exceptional devaluation might occur before the time
implied by the shortest maturity available, between maturities of deposits k
and k + 1 or, ￿nally, there might be a devaluation after the longest deposit
matures. De￿ning as ￿t;j the probability of a devaluation happening between












For the sake of illustration let us suppose that there are two maturities k = 7
and k = 30 days (this will be the case in the empirical illustration in the
following section). Then, it can be easily shown that
￿t;7 =




￿t;30 ￿ ￿t;7 ￿ (￿t;30 ￿ ￿t;7)
(￿t ￿ ￿t)
: (9)
By taking ratios or log-ratios of the expressions above, we can identify changes
in the time structure of subjective probabilities of a devaluation implied by the
term structure of interest rates. Furthermore, the ratios are independent of
the assumed size of the devaluation, ￿t. In particular, the indicator proposed,
Ij;s;t, aimed at comparing the probabilities of devaluation at horizons j and s













for j = 1;s > 1:
(10)
In order to make (10) operational, the expected appreciation parameter, ￿t
and the respective risk premia for each maturity need to be imputed. If we
assume that ￿t = 1 and ￿t;i = 0 8i, (10) boils down to the expression put
forward in Collins (1984). The problem with this setting is that it can lead to
negative probability estimates for empirical applications, and thus log-ratios
that are not de￿ned. The inclusion of risk premia and potential appreciation
expectations in (10) allows us to elaborate corrections of the basic indicator
to avoid negative probability ratios.
The problem of negative probability ratios is particularly important when deal-
ing with data from Eastern European transition economies. Taking the simple
7case without risk premium (i.e. setting ￿t;s = 0 8s above) and ￿t = 1, it
can be easily seen that for a relatively ￿ at yield curve in the foreign econ-
omy, if it;7 tends to be higher than it;30 negative values can be obtained in
the numerator of (9). This constellation, caused by a downward-sloping yield
curve in the domestic economy, is not unusual in the recent history of East-
ern European economies, where sustained disin￿ ationary experiences rendered
a term structure of interest rates with lower nominal interest rates in longer
maturities.
A simple correction to the simple setting based on future expected in￿ ation
can be put forward to link the setting including risk premium to a yield curve
that is potentially negatively sloped. In a disin￿ ationary framework, with
E(￿t;30j￿t) < E(￿t;7j￿t), we can correct the interest rate with longer maturity
(we denote the corrected rate by icorr:
t;30 ) by subtracting E(￿t;30j￿t)￿E(￿t;7j￿t)
from the original rate, so that the corrected numerator of equation (9) for the
case without risk premium is given by
￿
corr:











































t;30 if the basic setting is employed and long-maturity
interest rates are corrected for expected disin￿ ation. In practice, this correc-
tion could be carried out for maturities of 7 and 30 days, for instance, by
replacing E(￿t;7j￿t) with the realized in￿ ation level at time t and using a time
series model to obtain forecasts for ￿t;30. In our empirical application below,
we report the results of such a correction based on in￿ ation forecasts.
83 The warning mechanism in action in the Czech
and Russian currency crises
In this section, we apply the indicator put forward above to data from two
recent currency crises in Eastern Europe: the Czech Republic crisis in May
1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998.3 In both cases, we describe the economic
frameworks in which the currency crises took place and present the real-time
estimates of our indicator for both economies during the crisis period.
3.1 The 1997 Czech Republic crisis
In the early 1990s, the Czech Republic introduced a tight peg of the koruna
to the deutschmark (DM) and the US dollar (USD) that used a currency
basket made up of 65% DM and 35% USD from May 1993. The peg had
￿ uctuation bands of ￿ 0.5% up to February 1996 and ￿ 7.5% from February
1996 until May 1997 crisis, which materialized with the abandonment of the
peg on May 26, 1997 for a managed ￿ oating regime. The trade balance in the
Czech Republic, which had been systematically positive since the break-up
of Czechoslovakia, turned negative in 1996, with a corresponding slowing of
economic growth. HorvÆth (1999) interprets the current account de￿cit in the
Czech Republic as a re￿ ection of insu¢ cient private savings, which, coupled
with the institutional framework Czech banking at that time, made the de￿cit
unsustainable. Furthermore, the real exchange rate appreciated persistently
and continuously in the period 1992-1997. Although trend appreciation is a
common phenomenon in transition economies, which can be (at least partly)
explained through the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect by di⁄erential productivity
increases, Begg (1998) and HorvÆth (1999) argue that the real exchange rate
dynamics implied a loss of competitiveness of the Czech economy. The adverse
macroeconomic framework, together with an unstable political environment,
led to a speculative attack on the koruna and a change in the exchange rate
regime in May 1997.
Figure 1 shows the daily exchange rate of the Czech koruna against the bas-
ket in the period January-June 1997. The vertical line corresponds to the
abandonment of the peg. As it can be seen in Figure 1, the exchange rate
remained inside the ￿ 7.5% bands during the turmoil preceding the change in
the exchange rate regime, and depreciated strongly as soon as the managed
3The choice of the crises is exclusively based on data availability.
9￿ oat regime was in place. The fact that the monetary authorities were able
to keep the koruna inside the ￿ uctuation bands was mainly due to the heavy
central bank interventions taking place in the week preceding the breakdown
of the peg (see HorvÆth, 1999).
We calculated the indicator given by (10) using three di⁄erent maturities for
the Czech koruna exchange rate against both the DM and the USD for the
period ranging from January 1st, 1997 to the abandonment of the peg on May
27th, 1997. We used the daily interbank rates with maturity one week (it;7
and i￿
t;7) and one month (it;30 and i￿
t;30) for the Czech Republic and, alterna-
tively, Germany and the US.4 The yield curve implied by the term structure
of interbank rates in the Czech Republic is downward-sloping for most of the
sample. If we were to obtain an indicator based on the assumptions imposed
in Collins (1984) (that is, imposing ￿t = 1 and ￿j = 0 8j in (10)), the results
would imply negative values in the argument of the log-ratio corresponding to
￿t;30, since ￿t;30 tends to be systematically smaller than ￿t;7 for the sample at
hand. A possible way of overcoming this problem would be to redesign the log-
ratio of probabilities by adding a constant to the numerator and denominator
of the expressions in the log of (7) after setting ￿t;i = 0 8i. In our setting,
this can be reconciled with the existence of a certain maturity structure in
the risk premium, such that, for example, ￿t;j ￿ ￿t;j￿1 = ￿t;s ￿ ￿t;s￿1 = c < 0
8j > 1;j < s, coupled with appreciation expectations (so that ￿ < 1). In
Figure 2 we show the resulting indicator after adding 0.3 to the nominator
and denominator of the expression for I7;30;t in (7), so as to keep the structure
of relative changes in the original estimates of ￿t;7 and ￿t;30 but avoid negative
relative probabilities. The results presented in Figure 2 correspond to using
the US as the foreign economy, but are identical to those using Germany. The
results are also qualitatively identical for constants di⁄erent from 0.3, as long
as they avoid negative values in the argument of the log ratio. Furthermore,
the results are also similar if the indicator is constructed under the assumption
that k = 7 is not the shortest maturity.
Changes in the indicator can be interpreted as changes in the perceived proba-
bility of a crisis occurring in the following week as compared to a crisis happen-
ing in the period delimited by day seven and day thirty. The indicator remains
practically constant from January to mid-May, and starts increasing dramat-
ically on May 16th, re￿ ecting a strong change in the perceptions of investors
4The source of the data used in this study is Datastream.
10on the potential timing of a devaluation. The increase is strong and sustained
until May 28th, and from that day onwards the indicator slowly decreases to a
low level, comparable with the pre-crisis period. The indicator performs there-
fore extraordinarily as a (very-)short-term indicator of the crisis, and could be
used ex-post as a device for dating the de facto occurrence of the crisis (since,
de jure, the change of the exchange rate regime would be the corresponding
indicator).
Alternatively, we also made use of the daily one month forward rates (e
f
t;30)
for the koruna/USD exchange rate, which are available for the period under











Using these estimates we can include the dynamics of the risk premium in the
indicator. Since due to lack of data we do not have estimates of ￿t;7 for the
pre-crisis period, let us assume that the dynamics of ￿t;7 are similar to those
of our estimate of ￿t;30, although the level may be di⁄erent, so that we assume
￿t;30 < ￿t;7 in order to avoid negative probabilities, keeping the assumption
￿t = 1. 5 The resulting indicator is plotted in Figure 3. We also computed
the corresponding indicator for the German case, using a synthetic forward
rate (since forward rates for the koruna/DM are not available for the period)
obtained from other forward cross-rates and the resulting graph is similar to
Figure 3.
The results concerning the leading indicator properties of the log-ratio are
qualitatively similar to those obtained without the risk premium adjustment,
although the indicator series is now relatively more volatile in the pre-crisis
period.
We also performed the correction based on in￿ ation expectations as follows.
We used the realized in￿ ation rate at time t (denote ￿t as the in￿ ation rate in
period t based on monthly data) as a proxy for E(￿t;7), and for each period we
estimated di⁄erent models in order to obtain forecasts of ￿t;30 (￿t+1 in monthly
notation) using data up to time t. The dynamic behaviour of the corrected in-
dicator is similar to that reported in Figure 2 if simple autoregressive processes
5Seven-days forward exchange rates for the crisis period are available, and con￿rm that
the resulting risk premium for seven days was higher than ￿t;30.
11with and without deterministic trends are used as forecasting models. Since
these parsimonious models tend to forecast future in￿ ation relatively well, the
correction is not able to render positive values of ￿t;30 unless the data generat-
ing process assumed for in￿ ation contains nonlinear deterministic trends that
systematically produce strong disin￿ ationary forecasts.6
Until now, no reference has been made to the size of the change in the indicator
leading to a crisis signal. While several methods can be used to evaluate the
threshold leading to signi￿cant signals, an extremely simple one based on the
standarization of changes in the indicator seems to perform well. In Figure 4
we present the changes in the indicator at each period t standarized using the
average change and standard deviation realized up to period t￿1. We start the
exercise in April 1997 based on indicator changes ranging from January 1997
and we also plot the 5% critical values corresponding to a standard normal
distribution. The ￿rst signi￿cant change takes place on April 16th, and no
false signal is sent before the crisis.
While the aim of the indicator proposed is to serve as a short-term leading
indicator for exchange rate crises, we will study whether also in tranquil times
relative changes of the indicator contain information about future changes in
the exchange rate. This will be done by performing a simple out-of-sample
forecasting exercise for the pre-crisis sample. The forecasting abilities of an
autoregressive model on the ￿rst di⁄erence of the (log) exchange rate of the
Czech koruna against the USD and the DM will be compared to those of a
simple vector autoregressive (VAR) model including changes in the exchange
rate and the indicator with risk premium adjustment.
The forecasting exercise is carried out as follows. Using data from January 1st
to April 1st, 1997, an autoregressive model is estimated for the log changes in
the exchange rate, together with a VAR for the vector of log changes in the
exchange rate and the ￿rst di⁄erence of the indicator. In both cases, the lag
length of the model is chosen so as to minimize AIC for the sample. Using
the estimated models, out-of-sample forecasts are obtained for 1 to 30 (work-
ing) days ahead, and the forecasting errors are computed by comparing the
forecasts with the real data. The observation corresponding to April 2nd is
added to the sample, the models are estimated again and new out-of-sample
forecasts are obtained. This procedure is repeated until all available observa-
tions have been used. In our case, since we are interested in the informational
6Detailed results on the correction are available from the authors upon request.
12content of the indicator in the pre-crisis period, the full sample used ranges
from January 1st to May 20th. With the forecasts, we compute the root
mean square forecasting error (RMSFE) for each forecasting horizon, de￿ned
as RMSEh =
qPNh
n=1(en ￿ ^ en)2=Nh, where Nh is the number of h-steps ahead
forecasts computed, en is the actual value of the exchange rate and ^ en is the
corresponding forecast.
Table 1 presents the results of the forecasting exercise. For each exchange rate
considered, the improvement of RMSFE for the VAR model over the simple au-
toregression is presented for di⁄erent forecasting horizons. The results of the
corresponding Diebold-Mariano test (DM test, Diebold and Mariano, 1995)
for equality of forecasting ability is also reported in each case. The forecasting
abilities of the model including information on the indicator are superior to
those of the autoregressive model for all forecasting horizons in the case of
the US dollar, with marginal improvements on the forecasting error averaging
0.75% over the 30-day forecasting horizons. Although the improvement is very
modest, it should be pointed out that the particular exchange rate regime of
the Czech Republic for the period considered limited signi￿cantly the volatility
of exchange rate movements for the period. The improvements are furthermore
statistically signi￿cant for forecasting horizons over 5-days ahead. The results
are not so positive for the DM, where our indicator does not seem to pos-
sess information on future exchange rate developments for quiet periods. For
the one-month forecast horizon the model including the indicator improves in
RMSFE over the simple AR model, albeit not signi￿cantly.
3.2 The 1998 crisis in Russia
The Russian Central Bank announced in November 1997 that, starting January
1998, the ruble would be targeted at a central rate of 6.2 rubles/dollar, with a
￿ uctuation band of ￿ 15%. However, the volatility of the ruble/dollar exchange
rate was minimal in the months preceding the crisis (the standard deviation
of percentage changes in the exchange rate was 0.002 in the period January-
August, 1998). On August 17th, 1998, the Russian government announced the
devaluation of the ruble by the end of the year, defaulted on its government
debt and declared a 90-day moratorium on foreign debt. On August 26th
the Russian Central Bank declared that the ￿xed exchange rate could not
be supported any longer and on September 2nd, 1998 the Russian ruble was
13Exchange rate: Czech koruna/USD
Steps ahead RMSFE di⁄erence DM test Observ.
1 -1.271 % -0.705 34
5 -0.998 % -1.845￿￿ 30
10 -0.408 % -1.687￿￿ 25
15 -0.686 % -1.955￿￿ 20
20 -0.757 % -2.496￿￿￿ 15
25 -0.773 % -1.370￿ 10
30 -1.267 % -3.474￿￿￿ 5
Exchange rate: Czech koruna/DM
Steps ahead RMSFE di⁄erence DM test Observ.
1 0.156 % 1.053 34
5 0.062 % 0.866 30
10 0.052 % 0.679 25
15 0.050 % 0.787 20
20 0.027 % 0.509 15
25 0.066 % 0.867 10
30 -0.044 % -0.967 5
The column ￿RMSFE di⁄erence" is the di⁄erence between the RMSFE of the VAR model
and the AR model as percentage of the RMSFE of the AR model. The column ￿DM test"
refers to the Diebold-Mariano test for equal forecasting error (Diebold and Mariano, 1995).
*(**)[***] stands for signi￿cance at the 10%(5%)[1%] level.
Table 1: Pre-crisis forecasting exercise: Czech koruna/US dollar
￿ oated.7
Using the corresponding interbank interest rate data for Russia and the US,
we construct the indicator for the dynamics of the relative probability of a
crisis occurring in seven days as compared to the crisis taking place in the
interval delimited by seven and thirty days. The same problems as for the
case of the Czech Republic come up if the indicator proposed by Collins (1984)
is used, since the probability ratio turns negative in some periods due to the
downward-sloping term structure of Russian interbank rates. Figure 5 presents
the Russian ruble/USD exchange rate together with the indicator I7;30;t for
the period April-September, 1998, after assuming ￿t = 1, ￿7 = 0 and adding a
7For an excellent account of the Russian crisis, see Kharas et al. (2001)
14constant (one in this case) to the denominator of the expression in (10) so as
to avoid negative implied probabilities. The shaded area delimits the period
of time starting with the announcement of the devaluation and ending with
the ￿ oatation of the ruble.
The ￿rst relevant feature of I7;30;t is the fact that it has a positive trend in
the period under study. This implies that investors systematically changed
their expectations of the timing of an exchange rate crisis in the months pre-
ceding the actual occurrence of the Russian crisis. In this sense, as the crisis
approached, they tended to consider the event increasingly imminent. Apart
from this medium-run trend in I7;30;t, the indicator presents relevant increases
in the end of May, mid-July and a global peak following the announcement
of the devaluation, which precedes the change in the exchange rate regime by
seven (working) days. The ￿rst peak, on May 28, takes place right after the
central bank increased key interest rate to 150%. This is followed by a series
of interventions (involving the expenditure of $1 billion in reserves) in a suc-
cessful attempt to defend the ruble (see e.g. Chiodo and Owyang, 2002). The
indicator declines in the following days, and follows the positive trend that
dominates the full period. The second signal of a shift in expectations to an
imminent devaluation takes place in early July. The start of the increase co-
incides with the Russian parliament￿ s postponement of policy reforms needed
to qualify for IMF loans. Expectations of crisis timing shift away from one
week with the ￿nal approval of an IMF emergency loan to Russia in mid-July.
Finally, our indicator increases dramatically in the period August 10-18 in par-
allel to the collapse of the stock and bond markets (August 13) and in spite
of Boris Yeltsin￿ s declaration that ￿there will be no devaluation￿of the ruble
following an emergency parliamentary session on August 14. Our indicator
stabilizes on August 21, when the Russian crisis can already be felt in markets
all around the world. Although our indicator peaks when the crisis is already
being felt, the increase in I7;30;t is quite evident up to seven days before the
devaluation announcement. The dynamics of the indicator remain unchanged
after performing the in￿ ation expectation correction.8
Figure 6 presents the standardized changes in the indicator computed with
information up to period t for each observation. The indicator data used for
the standardization starts in January 1997, and the values corresponding to
the sample under study are presented in the ￿gure together with the 5% critical
8Detailed results are available from the authors upon request.
15values. The two peaks of the indicator that did not result in a crisis do not
appear signi￿cant at the 5% level, while the crisis signal does.
The minimal volatility of the ruble/US dollar exchange rate in the pre-crisis
period makes an out-of-sample exercise such as the one carried out for the
Czech Republic useless in this context. To sum up, our indicator is able to
identify both speculative pressures that were successfully combated by the
central bank in the pre-crisis period, and starts signaling the impending crisis
six days before the o¢ cial announcement of the devaluation.
4 Conclusions and further paths of research
The increased frequency and strength of currency crises in recent years has
motivated researchers in both public and private institutions to develop ef-
fective early-warning systems for currency crises. A vast majority of existing
approaches uses similar macroeconomic variables to forecast the timing of ￿-
nancial distress. In our opinion, fundamental data are perfectly suited to iden-
tifying the set of potentially vulnerable countries and, possibly, to explaining
crises after the fact. However, in our opinion, the desired forecasting instru-
ment needs to focus strongly on market sentiment as it is the participants on
foreign exchange markets who eventually trigger a crisis. Investor sentiment
is much more sensitive to short-term news and incoming signals than to un-
derlying long-term fundamentals. Along these lines, recent research suggests
that market-based forecasting tools possess fair predictive power and usually
outperform alternative instruments in terms of accuracy.
Thus, based on simple economic theory and exploiting the term structure of
relative interest rates, we constructed a very short-term early-warning indi-
cator to evaluate relative probabilities of a crisis occurring in di⁄erent time
horizons. Subsequently, we applied the indicator to data from two recent
Eastern European currency crises: the Czech koruna crisis in 1997 and Russia
ruble crisis in 1998. We found that our indicator performs extraordinarily as
a (very) short-term predictor of a crisis in both considered cases. We also
provided evidence that the indicator contains extra information about future
short-run exchange rate changes.
As seen in the Russian case study, even false alarms from the market need to be
taken seriously by central bankers and governments and all available short-term
16measures should be implemented. Likening our indicator to a thermometer,
a high body temperature does not necessarily imply serious illness, but is
always a reason for concern. In that sense, our indicator is useful for monetary
policy institutions as an extra signalling instrument to complement long-run
warning mechanisms. Several improvements to the methodology used in this
piece of research can be implemented to re￿ne the indicator. Among possible
avenues of research, using information on the time-varying nature of interest
rate volatility to proxy for developments in the risk premium may lead to
improvements in the signalling properties of the estimator.
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Figure 3   Czech Koruna: Exchange rate, January 1997-June1997 and I7,30,t 
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